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Abstract
Auction theory is a very interesting topic which studies mechanisms of various formats
for buying and selling goods. There are all kinds of mechanisms covered in the ambit
of auction theory, ranging from sealed bid auctions like first-price or second price
auctions, to open bid auctions like the English or Dutch auctions. One interesting kind
of auction is the all-pay auction, in which, as the name suggests, all the players pay
their bids. Analysis of all-pay auctions with virtual money has so far been neglected
in the auction theory literature. However, it can be used to design a mechanism with a
wide variety of applications including equitable resource allocation, and fairer systems
for legislation and corporate management. In this thesis, we shall present this novel
mechanism, analyze it in a game-theoretic framework and consider the variants of the
problem including the perfect and imperfect information cases. Furthermore, we shall
outline how to find the equilibrium bidding strategies for this mechanism which lead
to equitable distribution of resources. One possible application of this is in equitable
resource allocation, such as in a battlefield where different agents have competing
needs for limited resources to complete their missions. Finally, we shall draw the
connection between this mechanism, and the process of voting in the legislature or
the company board rooms. Currently, a party needs just more than 50% of seats
in the legislature to control 100% of the bills. Similarly, a shareholder needs just
51% of shares to completely control the company. We shall show how it is possible
to modify these voting systems, using the proposed mechanism to enable even the
minority players to have an equitable say in the decisions.
Thesis Supervisor: Emilio Frazzoli
Title: Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The problem of equitable distribution of limited resources is encountered in many
fields. It is often necessary to allocate objects among different people according to
some criterion like need or priority. For example, in a disaster relief situation, the
objective of an aid agency might be to distribute supplies to the victims in order of
their need, with larger families allocated more food than smaller families. Similarly,
in the emergency room of a hospital the doctors usually try to treat the patients with
most severe injuries first and only then attend to those who are lightly wounded.
In the military, higher priority missions are allocated more resources to fulfill their
objectives. In some countries VIPs, like the President or the Prime Minister, get
preference in the road, and the road is often closed to all traffic, till the VIP's convoy
has passed. In all these examples, the allocation of the resource was done not in a
market efficient way, but according to some other metric. For example, the exclusive
usage of the road by the VIP reduced the overall social benefit but was more in line
with the importance of the road users. Thus, by equitable allocation of resources, we
mean an allocation of resources that is commensurate with some user desired metric.
In this thesis, a novel auction based mechanism is described for equitable resource
allocation. The work was actually motivated by a desire to design a mechanism
that allows for a fair distribution of resources in existing social voting frameworks.
For example, in the current form of democracy, a political party needs only 51% of
seats in the legislature to control 100% of the decisions. Similarly, in a company,
a shareholder needs only 51% of the shares to completely 'own' the company. This
framework seems intrinsically unfair to the remaining 49% (minority) stakeholder. In
fact, attempts have already been made in this direction with the adoption of systems
like proportional representation and cumulative voting in Europe. However, these
systems go only as far as ensuring a fair representation at the legislature, but not a
fair allocation of resources (in this case parliamentary bills). The mechanism proposed
in this thesis tweaks the existing framework to allows the minority stakeholder to also
have a say in the decision-making process.
Moreover, it is also possible to draw a connection between the proposed mechanism
and auction theory. The mechanism turns out to be the same as all pay auction with
virtual money. The equivalent auction based-mechanism is found to be extendable to
a wide variety of situations where an equitable resource allocation is needed. There is
a large literature that already considers the problem of equitable resource allocation.
We summarize their results in Section 1.2, and also explain where our work fits in
the spectrum. Furthermore, the analysis of the all pay auctions with virtual money
also fills an important gap in auction theory. In Section 1.3 we describe the extent of
auction theory literature, and show where our work fits in with the work on all-pay
auctions.
As mentioned earlier, our mechanism can be used to solve problems where an
equitable allocation of limited resources needs to be made. Moreover, since it is an
auction based mechanism, it allows the free market dynamics to come into play, and
allows the agents full control in their allocation. The equitability of the allocation
is built into the mechanism in the form of allocation of the virtual money for the
auctions. This kind of allocation mechanism has the added advantage of being dis-
tributed, in that the allocation is not done in a centralized manner. However, for
any auction, regardless of format, it is important to find the bidding strategy. The
main contribution of this thesis is in identifying the equilibrium bidding strategies for
players under this mechanism.
The bulk of this chapter is used to introduce the problem in detail, and describes
previous work done in this field. Chapter 2 describes the mathematical formulation
of the problem in a game theoretic framework, and then characterizes the properties
of the Nash Equilibria for the problem. Chapter 3 contains the bulk of the analysis
work done in this thesis. Finally Chapter 4 provides applications of this problems to
other fields such as economics and political science. Chapter 5 sums up the results
of the thesis, and points out other interesting avenues of research available in this
relatively unexplored field.
1.1 Motivations for Equitable Resource Allocation
The previous section mentioned some examples of where allocation is done in a need
based or priority based manner. However, in those examples, allocation is decided by
a centralized authority. We shall now elaborate on how similar problems and other
the real world applications can be solved using our proposed framework.
Consider a situation where there are a number of agents in a battlefield, each
pursuing his mission. The different missions have different priorities, and require re-
sources that have limited supply like reconnaissance UAVs, strike drones and satellite
pictures. In a battlefield, it is hard to relay the situational information to a central-
ized server if the communications bandwidth is limited or the communications can
be compromised. Moreover, since the military command would like to allocate the
resource in a fair manner, the problem can be challenging at times. This begs the
question of what is fair. In this case, "fair" can be defined as allocation of resources
commensurate to the priority of the mission, since that is the main differentiating
criterion to the military headquarters. In general, a fair distribution would be a dis-
tribution according to some user defined criterion like the need or the buying power
of the agent. Once the metric for fair has been decided, the auction based method
outlined in Chapter 2 can be used to equitably distribute the resources.
Another example of this kind of problem setup would be in air traffic control
where different aircraft have different fuel deadlines for landing, and aircraft taking
off also have constraints on trying to maintain their schedule. Thus, in an auction
based allocation process, the aircraft can bid on different time slots on the runways
of an airport, where the number of bids may be assigned according to the need of the
aircraft or the amount the airline is willing to pay the airport. A similar situation
occurs in scheduling for aircraft carriers, where there are more numerous tasks to be
done by the aircraft, like refueling, weapons loading, before taking off. All these can
be performed on limited number of stations, and aircrafts can again try to get time
slots at stations through some auction mechanism.
Other applications for this mechanism include topics ranging from economics to
political science. For example, we can solve the board-room decision making problem,
where the board of governors of a company can use this process to ensure that even
minority stakeholders have a say in company decisions. Similarly in a democracy,
implementing an auction based voting scheme in the parliament would allow the
minority parties to get bills passed in their favor. In international affairs, such an
approach can be applied to the voting in the Security Council to replace the veto
power of the permanent members. This would empower the Security Council to
take decisive actions without getting bogged down by the political bickering and veto
threats from permanent members.
In all these examples, the proposed mechanism, through free market dynamics,
converges to an allocation that has the desired characteristics. Moreover, since the
agents get a chance to bid on the resource themselves, they feel more empowered than
if a centralized agency were to allocate the same resource to the agents.
1.2 Previous Work in Resource Allocation
So far, we have seen examples of where this new mechanism may be applied. However,
the picture remains incomplete without a description of existing resource allocation
literature and where this proposed mechanism fits into it. Resource allocation mecha-
nisms can be divided into two main types: centralized and distributed. In centralized
resource allocation, as the name suggests, the decisions for the allocation of the re-
sources are done at a centralized location, and the only means the individual agents
have for conveying their preferences is through their valuation for the objects being
allocated. Examples of centralized resource allocation are provided in references [1],
[2] and [3]. It is the most natural approach that comes to mind when attempting
to solve the problem of resource allocation. Centralized resource allocation methods
tend to work well when there is good communications connectivity between the agents
and the centralized server so that the agents can fully communicate their preferences
to the centralized decision making body. On the other hand, if the preferences of
the agents cannot be easily be quantified (e.g. ordinal preferences), or change over
time, it becomes difficult for them to fully convey their desires to the centralized
decision maker. In such situations, the decentralized approaches can be better ap-
plied for resource allocation. Another main factor for the selection of distributed
resource allocation is limited communications. Usually, if communications are costly
or the bandwidth is limited, distributed methods can better solve the resource allo-
cation problem. In the distributed mechanisms, the agents communicate with their
neighbors, and the information gets propagated down the network till a consensus
is reached. References [4], [5], [6] and [7] illustrate examples of distributed resource
allocation.
Now, auction based mechanisms lie somewhere in between centralized and dis-
tributed, since bids are made by the individual agents, but the mechanism requires a
centralized auctioneer to select the winners. However, some variants like [8] and [9]
have been developed where the agents themselves take turn in acting as the auction-
eer, making the mechanism completely distributed. References [10], [11] and [12] use
variants of auction based methods for resource allocation. Most of these methods,
use the value or marginal value of the object being auctioned as their bid, and there
is no virtual money involved. Moreover, most of these mechanisms use first price or
second price auctions. Due to this, these mechanisms usually tend to converge to an
allocation that is in some sense socially optimal. However, most of these do not have
any means for allowing the allocation to be equitable according to any user specified
metric. The mechanisms proposed in this thesis not only allows equitable allocations
to happen, but incorporates it into the dynamics of the process itself.
Equitable resource allocation falls under the ambit of fair allocation problems.
Different people have used different definitions of fairness. The concept of max-
min fairness was employed by Ogryczak et. al. in [13]. Others like Kelly [14] and
Viswanath [15] have tried to use proportional fairness. Another popular metric for
fairness is envy-free fairness first used by Foley [16] in 1967 and also used by Choi et.
al. [17].
In the literature, the term 'equitable' resource allocation has been used in [18] and
[19]. However, the term has different meanings in both those papers. Neither of them
define equitable distributions to mean allocation proportional to any desired user de-
fined metric, which is the definition for 'equitable allocation' we will use in this thesis.
In fact, our definition of equitable allocation has also been called competitive fairness
by Sun in [20] and [21]. In his paper, Sun considers the same all-pay auction based
mechanism, but limits himself to the analysis of the two player imperfect information
case, where neither player know the valuation of the other. In this thesis, the results
of Sun are extended for the multi-player games, and then modified for application to
voting scenarios like in democracy. Moreover, even the perfect information case is
considered in this thesis. The perfect information case is much more complex since
there exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium and one must consider the space of
mixed strategies.
1.3 Previous Work in Auction Theory
There is also an extensive body of work done in auction theory. An auction involves
the sale of an item through a bidding process. There are multiple types of auc-
tions. The most commonly used is the first price sealed bid auction. The next most
frequently analyzed auction is the second price auction, where the winner pays the
second highest bid. [22] provides a detailed description of the various auction formats
and it shows that the optimal strategy for each player is to bid his value of the item
in the first and second price auctions. There are also other types of auctions like the
English auction and the Dutch auction etc.
A less commonly encountered auction is the all-pay auction, where as the name
Figure 1-1: Gap in Auction Theory
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implies, all the players pay their bid regardless of whether they win. All pay auctions
were first introduced by Gordon Tullock in [23], and hence are sometimes called
Tullock Auctions. Smith, [24], used all-pay auctions to analyze the problem of war
of attrition. They were also used by Dasgupta and Stiglitz [25] in 1980 for modeling
the patent competition. Finally, Baye [26] used it in 1993 to analyze the process of
lobbying in politics. However, none of them consider the problem of all-pay auction
with virtual money. In an all-pay auction with virtual money auction, all the players
are allocated some virtual money a centralized agency, which they then use to bid on
the auctions. Unlike in all-pay auctions with real money, players have an incentive
to bid all the money in virtual money auctions so that they can win as much as
possible. On the other hand, in auctions with real money, players tend to avoid
bidding unless they know they have a good chance of winning since not winning after
bidding corresponds to a direct financial loss. Essentially, all-pay auctions with virtual
money correspond to all-pay auctions with real money, but with the added constraint
that all the virtual money be spent. The constraint changes the nature of the game,
and leads to a completely different kind of equilibrium. It has been shown in [20] and
[21] that under certain conditions it is possible to get a payoff proportional to your
budget of virtual money, enabling the mechanism to have an equitable allocation.
The reason this format of auctions are important is because they can be used
as a mechanism for a number of problems. As mentioned in the earlier sections,
all-pay auctions with virtual money can be used to solve equitable resource alloca-
tion problems. It can also be applied to problems where voting is currently used
for decision making (like in a board-room or parliament). The connection between
these voting mechanisms, and all-pay auction had not been made till now and the
proposed mechanism provides insights and new possibilities in this field. It has the
potential for making some key-impact changes to the way legislating is done in a
democracy. All this is further described in chapter four. For now, we shall move over
to a mathematical formulation of the problem and discuss this in the next chapter.
Chapter 2
Problem Formulation
So far we have just used the term 'equitable resource allocation' to describe the
problem that we are trying to solve. However, it is still important to describe the
problem in a mathematical framework, if we are to analyze it. In this chapter we shall
mathematically formulate the problem and then describe our proposed mechanism
to solve the problem. Finally, we rigorously cast the problem in a game theoretic
framework. In the next chapter, we attempt to characterize some solutions to it.
The solutions are essentially equilibrium strategies for the game. We shall start off
by characterizing some properties of the Nash Equilibria, and then provide the exact
solutions for simplified cases. Finally we generalize the solutions to other cases.
2.1 Problem Formulation
Suppose we have a set of 'm' resources which needs to be allocated among 'n' players.
Each player 'i' values resource 'j' as v. Usually, it is expected that there should
be some positive correlation between the valuations of each item among different
players, but it is not imposed as a condition in our framework. Moreover, we want to
allocate the resource in such a way that the player 'i' has a total utility proportional
to bi. This kind of situation occurs fairly often, and we can cast all the examples in
the introduction, in this mold. The bi here quantifies the metric for the fairness of
allocation. It could be the mission priority in the battle field, or the landing deadline
at the airport, or even the seriousness of a patient's injury in the emergency room. The
point is that bi quantitates the user specified metric for allocation. Mathematically,
the optimization problem becomes:
Minimize:
E vi - kbi (2.1)
i=1 (j=1
Such that:
6i E {o, 1} Vij (2.2)
n
6 -= I Vj (2.3)
k E R+ (2.4)
If this were to be solved by a centralized agency, it would be the solution to an
Integer Program. Since it may not be possible to ensure that all the players are al-
located resources equitably, the goal would be to ensure that the net deviation from
equitable allocation is minimized. However, since centralized mechanisms are not
suitable for all situations, we shall now describe our proposed decentralized mecha-
nism for solving this problem. It is easy to see that resource allocation (Eqn. 2.3) can
be done by sequentially auctioning off the resources one by one. However, the trick
is to ensure that through this process, the allocation of resources is equitable (Eqn.
2.1). Suppose if for the auctions, each player 'i' is allocated a sum of virtual money
given by: Ni = Nb 2/(E bi). Thus in the battlefield example, the votes each team gets
is proportional to its priority. Similarly, in the boardroom example, the stakeholders
get votes proportional to their shares, and in the parliament, the parties get votes
proportional to their seats in the house. Then we can allocate the resources by having
all the players participate in all-pay auctions for all the items, with each item going
to the winner of that particular auction. Now as each item is being auctioned, each
player selects the number of votes he wants to cast for that item, and the player who
bids the most votes wins. In case of tie, the item is given to the highest bidders with
equal probability. We denote nk to be the votes player i casts for item k. The only
constraint is that players can not bid more votes than the total number that they
have, and that the auction is in all-pay format i.e. all players pay their bid. Thus,
the players will bid a total of Ni votes in the 'm' auctions. Therefore,
m
N1 = En n
k=1
The players do not wish to cast less than Ni votes since the votes are effectively
virtual money and have no value at the end of auctions. In fact, that is the major
differentiating factor between the work done in this thesis and what is available in
the literature, since the literature has mainly considered auctioning with real money
while here we consider virtual money. The order of auction can be assumed to be
in descending order value since it is reasonable to allow the player with most buying
power to be able to win the higher valued items more easily. The problem, then,
is to determine the number of votes the players need to cast for each item so as to
maximize their utility. Here the utility (U) is defined as the total value earned by
the players:
m
k=1
where,
1/p if p players share the highest bid for item 'k', and player 'i' is among them
0 otherwise
It is hoped that ultimately we shall have Ui oc bi V i when following some equilibrium
strategy. Indeed part of this mechanism design problem is to tune the allocation of the
virtual money such that this happens. If equitable allocation is not possible, we would
like to minimize the deviance from equitable allocation (i.e. min E_ 1U - kbil).
We can look at this problem from a game theoretic approach where the payoff of
each player is the utility (Ui) and the strategy of the player is the set of votes cast:
Si = {n} "_1. Moreover, let S denote the set of all possible strategies.
Thus, in our game theoretic framework we have, the optimal strategy for player
'i' is given by:
max, min5,U_(si, s-)
such that,
n k= Ni Vi
k=1
n k > 0 V i k
In this thesis, we shall try to find the optimal bidding strategies for the players
under this mechanism, and show that it is indeed possible to obtain an equitable
distribution for some equilibrium strategies.
There are two possible variants of this problem:
" The perfect information case, where each player knows the valuations of all the
other players
* The imperfect information case, players know only their own valuations and not
those of others.
We shall solve each problem in turn and characterize the Nash Equilibria in each case.
In the actual analysis, we try to analyze the infinite horizon versions of this problem.
One main reason for doing so is that considering the infinite horizon version is more
tractable to analysis, and provides more insight, whereas the finite horizon solutions
are more numerical in nature. In the infinite horizon, what happens is that the total
amount of virtual money loses its meaning. Instead, the virtual money constraint
translates into a constraint on the average spending per round of the auctions. That
constraint simplifies the analysis quite a lot, since you don't have to keep tabs on
the remaining money any more, and the action in the next round is independent of
actions in all the previous rounds. Now, let us mention some properties of the perfect
and imperfect information cases, which are later described in detail in Chapter 3. In
perfect information case, there can exist no Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE)
since the majority player can always outbid the minority player in all auctions, and
thus the minority player always has an incentive to change his strategy. The formal
proof of this is provided in the next chapter. Therefore, we look for mixed strategy
Nash Equilibria for this problem. On the other hand, in the imperfect information
case, the players do not know the valuations of the other players. Thus in order to be
able to solve this problem, the players need to know the distribution from which the
valuations of the other players are drawn. Once these distributions are known, a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium can be found. (PSNE is possible here precisely because the
other player's valuation is not known, but the probability that his valuation is lower
than yours is known). Let us mathematically write out the perfect and imperfect
information cases of this problem:
For the imperfect information case, let fi(Xi) be the bidding function mapping the
normalized value (Xi) of the item to player i's bid. Moreover, P( is used to denote
the Cumulative Distribution Function corresponding to the Probability Distribution
Function p(. Moreover, we assume a uniform distribution for the valuations of each
player. (It is not necessary, but it makes analysis tractable). Finally, the problem is
formulated as:
maxf, minf U = jxIP(f (X -) fi(Xi))px,(xi)dxi
0
such that,
jfi(x)dx = Ni V i
Similarly for the perfect information case, we have pmf's for the strategies for
each player. Let the strategy for player 'i', si, be given by support {aI, ... , a'}, and
the probability mass distribution corresponding to that support {pI, ..., p' }. For the
two player case, if player 2 is the majority player, we must have:
a' < a 2 a' <....<a2
Moreover, such a strategy-pair 's', must satisfy the following problem:
n+1
U1 = maxs1minS2 p'(I(a', a'_1)
i=2
n+1
p = 1
i=1
n+1
i=1n+1
i=
n+1
a p = N2
ip
p p >0Vi
where,
I(al,af ) = 02
0.5
if al > a2_1
if a' = a2_1
Now, for most of the thesis, we shall limit our analysis to the two player game. How-
ever, since the results for two-player game already exist for the imperfect information
case, we shall extend it to multiplayer for that problem.
Finally, let us define some notation that we shall use throughout this thesis.
Minority and Majority Players: In a two player game let player 1 be the
minority player, and player 2 the majority player (i.e. Ni < N2 ).
Minority Fraction: We define the Minority Fraction as the fraction of the total
votes in possession of the minority player. We denote this Minority Fraction by p.
N1
Value Improvement of a strategy: For a given strategy, we define the 'value
such that
i-1
+ P )
j=1
improvement' of the strategy as the increase in utility for the minority player from
the worst case utility, and denote this as A(p)|,. Thus,
A(p)|s = E{U1 - U1,worst}
Since the worst case utility is U1,,orst = 0, essentially, A(p) = U1. We also define
'optimal value improvement' (A* (p) I) as the best possible value improvement in the
set of possible strategies for a given p. A*(p)|,- = maxs{Ui(s)} The strategy that
maximizes the above value is known as the optimal strategy s* = argmaxscs{Ui(s)}
2.1.1 Is value improvement possible?
If we consider the kind of voting systems in existence, like the current form of democ-
racy, we notice that in them the players get assigned a fixed number of votes for each
individual auction. This allows the majority player to win every individual auction,
and the minority player never gets a chance to win. Our proposed auctioning format
circumvents this problem by assigning a fixed number of votes to be used among a
set of auctions. This allows the minority a chance to win a subset of auctions. The
following theorem formally proves that our proposed format allows for A(p)Is > 0.
Theorem 1. Vp G (0,1/2), ] a strategy 's' such that A (p) |s > 0 for that strategy.
Proof. We prove this by construction. All available strategies of the majority party
have at least one auction (k) with n' < NI/m votes. Consider any strategy 's' for the
minority in which one of the auctions (1) is randomly selected and is assigned votes
nc E [N2/m, N1 ]. Thus, this strategy has a non-zero probability of winning over all of
the available strategies of the majority player, and the expected payoff is more than
the worst-case payoff where minority always loses. Thus, E{U1} > 0, and thereby
A(P) I > 0.
Now, that we know that it is possible to choose strategy 's' such that A (p) , > 0,
we want to find 's*', for A*(p)|s.. Because of this, we we are interested in finding
the Nash Equilibria of this game, and see, if we can find the strategy that maximizes
the minority's expected payoff. In the following chapter we shall analyze the perfect
and imperfect information versions of the problem, the mathematical formulation of
which was done in this chapter.
Chapter 3
Analysis
In this chapter, we shall analyze both the perfect and imperfect information cases of
our mechanism, and try to obtain the equilibrium strategies for both. These were
mathematically formulated in the previous chapter. Moreover, we mentioned some
properties about the existence (or lack thereof) of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria for
these problems. In this chapter we prove those properties and outline some charac-
teristics of the solution strategies to these problems.
Imperfect Information Case
As described in the previous chapter, in the imperfect information case, the players
know their own valuations of the items and do not know the other players' valuations.
Instead, they know the distribution from which the other players' valuations are
drawn. This assumption about the valuations can be thought of as a situation where
payoffs are due to some external event, and hence can be determined by random
variables,Xi, with a CDF F (F (x) = P (Xi < x)). This problem was first considered
by Sun in [20]. In his work he assumed uniform distribution for the valuations since
they are the easiest to analyze. He derived properties for the Nash equilibria in the
imperfect information, two-player infinite horizon game. These results are reproduced
(without proof) below. Further details for the proofs can be found in [21]. We now
define the notation used in the subsequent analysis. fi(xi) is the bidding function for
player 'i'. It maps the player's valuation to his bid. Sun also defines g', (xi, bi) =
XiP(f 2 (X 2 ) < bi), where player l's valuation is xi, and bid is bi. We define similar
functions for player 2. Furthermore the assumption of normalized valuation, i.e.
values drawn from the uniform distribution [0,1] is made. Moreover, the bids are also
normalized to be between [0,1]. Using that he gets the following results:
Lemma 2. If (fj*, f2*) is a Nash equilibrium strategy pair, f,*(1) f*(1)-
Lemma 3. A strategy pair (fj*, f*) is a Nash equilibrium strategy pair, if and only if
D ( i*f (x2, f2*(x2)) = c2, for some constants ci, and c2, for
all x1 G [0,1] and all X2 E [0,1].
Lemma 4. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the two players are given by:
f*(X) = cXz+1 f2(X) = cX+ 1
where -y and c are given by:
Jf*(x)dx = p f2*(x)dx = 1 - p
Now if we convert this result to our situation where the valuation is uniformly
distributed between [0, U], and the votes can take values between [0, N], we get a
modified result of:
Lemma 5. The Nash Equilibrium bidding function for the two parties are given by:
f* (il) = cN (v)
f V ) = cN
where,
1 - 2p + V 3 p2 - 3 p+1
p
and,
c = 1+ V 3 p2 - 3p+l
Finally, from this the main result of Sun's paper is obtained where it is shown
that the payoff is equitable.
Theorem 6. When the payoffs of the bills are i.i.d uniform, then there exists a
bidding strategy for the minority that guarantees a total payoff fraction of p.
Proof. By using the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Lemma 5, as the strategy, the
expected effective payoff for both the minority (G*) and the majority (G*) can be
calculated. We find that:
From this we can clearly see
of seats.
pNU
1+ 3p2 - 3p+l
* (1 - p)NU
2 1 f~2 -3p + 1
that the payoffs are in direct proportion of the fraction
E
Another interesting property derived in [20] is that G* + G* is at least 3/4 of the
social payoff if every bill was just assigned to the party that valued it more.
We shall now extend it to the n-player imperfect information case. The Lemmas 2
and 3 can be trivially generalized to the case of n-players. Then, using those results,
we obtain the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the n-player case.
Theorem 7.
is given by:
In the n-player game, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the players
f*(x) = cNx,
where:
y= -- 1
ai
n
c -i a
and ai is the buying power of player i.
(3.1)
Proof. We have for each player i, if f* is the equilibrium bidding strategy:
n
ai = 1
I 1f*(x)dx = ag N
If the bid of player i is bi and its valuation of the current object is xi, then we have:
gf * (x, b*) = U_1 jgi
Then,
G j x I_ >iff -1(f (x))dx,
Now, applying the multiplayer version of Lemma 3, we have:
89g * f(Xi, bi)( f*' (f_(f* (x)))
Let,
fi*(x) = cNx7i V i
Then,
fi*-1 (x) = (x/Nc)l/7y
and,
f*-1 (fi*()) =
Vi
Vi
= ci V i
Finally,
X xyn * -4~jl(f*()
I z 1 n 1Zk, k7 iC /)
(i*' Yj - ii ()
X E cn X~k1 kiYyj )
n N
1, j 7cN
(=1, j: iyc
+ 1 kgi ) (7*+1)
7 1- +E 1 i Y
For Left hand side to equal the Right hand side in the above equation, we must have:
k=1
For the other conditions, we appeal to the bidding functions mean constraints.
1
aiN = cNxidx
X-Yi+l 1
ai= c Ti = 1 0
C
7 + 1
Therefore, for the remaining 'n' variables we get:
C
y= -- 1 Vi
ai
Finally, plugging these into the first condition:
n
Ck
k=1 C - k
This can clearly be written as a n-th degree polynomial. 'c' is the largest positive root
of the above equation. This finally defines the bidding strategies of the n-players. E
Figure 3-1 shows what the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria look like for a three
player game. In this game the player fractions are set at 50%, 30% and 20% respec-
tively.
Nash Bidding Strategies for 3 Players
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Figure 3-1: Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a three player game
The N has been set to 1 in the above figure. As you can see, for a given valuation of
the object, the 50% player outbids the 30% player, who in turn outbids the 20% player.
This leads to the minority players winning only when they value the object highly
while the larger players value the object less. Now let us move on the the calculation
of expected payoffs on following these equilibrium strategies. The expected payoff of
each player in this situation is given by:
Theorem 8. In the n-player game, the expected payoff for the players is given by:
aCU
G C= (3.2)
-- - ------------ . .............
where c is the largest root of the polynomial given by:
n
C - O'i
and a2 is the buying power of player i.
Proof. Applying the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium from the previous theorem, we
get:
Gi = 
1
0
xlI f - (fj*(x))dz
0 x 1 j dx
1+:7 /'y 1d
X1+E7'=i -Yi/-Yj
1+ E_ n Z/-
= 1(since, 74/hi = 1)
i t
(3.3)
(3.4)
(3.5)
(3.6)
(3.7)
j=1
However, recall that, 1+7Y = c/ai Thus,
Similarly, we can also derive a corresponding bound on the ratio of the equitable
optimum and social optimum.
Theorem 9. E_, G* is at least (n+1)/(2n) of the social payoff if every bill was just
assigned to the party that valued it more.
Proof. The social optimum is given by:
Gsocia = E[max{X1, X 2 . , X }]
since each Xi is a uniform random variable between [0,1], let the random variable Y
= max{Xi, X 2 .  , Xn}. Then, the CDF of this random variable is given by:
P(Y < y) = y"
On differentiating, we get the PDF as:
f(y) = ny"-1
Finally, taking the expected value of this gives us:
G,*ociai = j yfdy (3.8)/10soci+1 1
- ny +1 1(3.9)
n +1 0
n (3.10)- n + 1 ( - 0
On the other hand, the worst case value that Ei_1 Gi can take is if all the allocation
goes to one player. In this case, since for some 'i', ai = 1, and for all j / i, o= 0
we get c = 2, and thus:
i=1
Thus, the ratio of equitable to social optimum is always lower bounded by:
n n +1I(G* ;> G*ocan2 i G - 2ni social
With this we can see that even in the multi-player case, we have pure strategy
Nash Equilibria that yield an equitable distribution of resources. Now let us move on
to the analysis of the perfect information case.
3.1 Perfect Information Game
In this section we analyze the perfect information version of the game. In the perfect
information case, we assume that all players know the valuations of all the other
players. This leads to certain characteristics for the Nash Equilibria that we shall
discuss later in this section. In the meantime, let us consider the outcome of a most
naive strategy to how this process works out.
3.1.1 Naive Strategy
We now describe a naive strategy that might be tempting at first glance. Consider
a situation where there are 'm' items of equal value are available, and there are two
players with a total of N1 and N2 votes respectively. Also, the the tie breaking rule
is to allocate the item to either player with equal probability. Consider the situation
where the two players naively choose to distribute their votes equally between NjmN, +N 2
and N 2 ' randomly selected items. Then their expected number of items won are:
In case of 'i' items bid in common, expected number of items won are: Nl - i
won outright, won with bids on them, and -1 won with no bids on them. So the2 2
overall number of items won by the first player are: Nim Similarly, the overall
number of items won by the second player are: N 2 m Thus this seems to be a
strategy yielding an equitable distribution. However, we can see that this is not a
Nash Equilibrium, since the players have an incentive to deviate from this strategy
by reducing their items with high bid, and spreading out a low bid in all other items
to exclusively win the items that were currently not bid upon in this example.
In the following section, we shall discuss more about these Nash Equilibria in
detail.
3.2 Equilibrium Strategies
In this section, we analyze the various properties of the Nash Equilibria for this game.
We shall provide algorithms to compute the Nash Equilibrium that we mentioned in
the earlier section. We will also provide characterization of the Mixed Strategy Nash
equilibria for a simplified case, and then generalize it.
3.2.1 Existence of Nash Equilibria
In the perfect information case, all players have complete information on their own
valuations and the valuations of their opponents. Under this framework, we shall
show that there doesn't exist any pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 10. If the valuations for each auction are known to all players, then there
exists no Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. We shall prove this statement by contradiction. Suppose, if possible, there
existed a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the perfect information case. Since it
is a pure strategy, it is possible for both parties to deduce the strategies of their
opponents. Suppose, for a bill of value (vI, v2), the minority spends ni votes, while
the majority spends n2 votes according to the Nash Equilibrium pure strategy. Now,
consider the strategy of Player 2 (majority). Clearly, if n2 < ni, the majority can
increase the number of votes till n2 > n1. This is feasible since the majority has
a larger amount of total votes and can easily spend at least one vote more than
minority for all the auctions. However, if the majority always outbids the minority,
then A(p) = 0. On the other hand, if A(p) = 0, the majority has at least one auction
where it spends less than N 2/m votes, and the minority has incentive to change its
strategy by outbidding the majority at this auction. Thus, in all cases, there does
not exists any Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium for the perfect information case. El
Since our goal is an equitable distribution of the resources, the ideal distribution
should have the ratio of the payoffs as close to the ratio of total votes as possible.
Thus, we need to appeal to the set of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria, in hope of a
more equitable strategy. Prom Theorem 1, we can see that the Mixed strategies yield
payoffs with A(p) > 0. Thus, we would like to find the optimum Mixed Strategy
Nash Equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of the minority.
When use the term 'mixed strategy', it is important to clarify what we mean. By
'mixed strategy' we mean a strategy where the bid for each player at every auction is
chosen randomly according to some rule. Now this can be done either by fixing the
auction, and randomly choosing the bid or by fixing the bid and randomly choosing the
auction. The former is more useful when faced with different auctions with different
valuations. On the other hand, the latter is more useful if all auctions have the same
valuation. However, if we consider the infinite horizon version of the problem, both
the types of randomization become tantamount to the same thing. Finally, due to the
constraints on the probability mass functions, the mixed strategy equilibrium here
differs from the one defined by Nash in that the expected payoff is not equal over the
support. Thus, we define the mixed strategy equilibrium to be a strategy pair where
in there is no incentive for either player to deviate.
We now return to the situation we described when discussing the naive strategy.
Here we fixed the values and randomly chose the auctions. As mentioned earlier, all
players had an incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategy. In fact, the way
they deviated was by reducing their items with high bid, and spreading out a low bid
in all other items to exclusively win the items that were initially not bid upon. We
can describe these strategies as bimodal, since the bids for the different auctions take
binary values. In case of the naive strategies the bids were either 0 or N 1 +N 2 . These
bimodal strategies are definitely better for the minority than the unimodal strategy
where the minority would bid Ni/m votes for each round, while the majority would
bid N2/m per round, thereby winning all rounds. Thus, by switching to bimodal
strategies, the minority can improve his payoff. It is logical to want to optimize
among the set of bimodal strategies. The naive strategy was not an optimum among
the bimodal strategies, and due to that, there was an incentive to deviate from it.
We shall now provide an algorithm to find that optimum among the set of bimodal
strategies.
Let (a, p) and (b, q) be used to describe the strategies of the minority and majority,
respectively. Let the values of a and b stand for the number of votes cast for p and q
auctions by the minority and the majority, respectively. The remaining votes for each
party are equally distributed among the remaining p and q items, respectively. If the
minority selects p items among the m items and the majority selects q, then consider
the event that there are exactly r bills in the intersection of the two selections. The
value F(p,q,r) is the probability of such an event. It can be evaluated by finding
the probabilities of exactly having partitions of sizes p-r, q-r and r from among m
objects. In the definitions that follow, U1 and U2 are the normalized utilities of the
minority and majority, assuming that all bills are identical. We also define c which
stands for the number of votes that go into the p bills that minority selects, and d
is defined in the same manner. Furthermore we can characterize some properties of
the majority player's strategies. For example, he will try to minimize the wastage of
his votes, and will therefore select his modes numbers at exactly one more than the
minority's modes. Moreover, since the minority loses all his bids at the lowest mode,
he sets his value of c to 0. Thus, the majority selects d = 1. On applying the total
vote constraint, we have:
ap < Ni < (a + 1)p
Similarly,
bq+m-q < N2 < (b+1)q+m-q
N2 - m
q b - 1
And since, b - 1 a, we get:
N2 - mq =
In the bimodal case, this leaves only p as the decision variable for the maximization
problem given by: Solve,
p= argmaxpIw{U1 (p)}
where,
P
Ui(p) = (p - r) F (p, q, r)
r=O
F(p, q,) p!q!(m - p)!(m - q)!
m!(m + r - p - q)!r!(p - r)!(q - r)!
with,
9=(N2-m-a
a [NP
and once p* is found we have: a* = *
b* a* + 1
N2-m-a*
c* 0
d* = 1
Clearly this is a 0(m) problem, and can be computed quite fast. Moreover, in this
strategy the Majority has no incentive to deviate. Here, the minority can improve his
payoff by setting some of his bids to a value larger than d. Such a strategy would,
however, belong to the class of trimodal strategies. Thus, within the class of bimodal
strategies, minority has no incentive to deviate. Another interesting point to note
here is that since the number of votes and the number of bids are discrete, we often
see that due to roundoff issues, sometimes the majority and minority player have
some votes left over. However, they cannot use those votes without changing their
strategy to trimodal. The results of solving the above problem is shown in the Figure
3-2 below. Here the Optimum minority payoff is plotted with respect to the minority
fraction (p).
Clearly, the results show that the optimum bimodal payoff is much better than
the unimodal payoff of 0. However, it is still quite far from the desired equitable
payoff. This figure corresponds to the situation where there were 100 auctions with
a total of 10 votes per auction. However, as the number of auctions increases, the
corresponding figure shift up. As we shall see later in Section 3.2.2, this result is
already quite close to the infinite horizon bimodal optimum.
Now let us try to generalize this, and describe some properties of the generalized
case. If we choose a support of k-atoms instead of 2 atoms described above, we get
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Figure 3-2: Bimodal Payoff in Finite Horizon
the k-atomic problem. The k-atomic problem essentially describes a situation where
the minority casts from among {aI, al, ... , a'} votes for the bills, while the majority
party casts from among {a2, a ., a'} votes for the bills. Note that there is no
condition that the atoms need to be unique. Thus, set of k-modal strategy includes
all the subset lower modal strategies. The only constraint is that the total number
of votes spent by each party should not exceed the total number of votes available to
them. As we can see this is a combinatorial optimization problem, and the number
of possible allocations increases significantly with the number of atoms. However, by
following similar methods to bimodal, we can find the k-modal optimum. Moreover,
we can say the following about finding the k-th modal optimal for this problem:
Lemma 11. At the k-modal optimum, the majority player always plays bi > ai V ai E
A, where A is the set of all the modes of the minority player.
Proof. Follows trivially from the fact that the majority player has more votes overall
than the minority player, he can outbid the minority player at each of the modes. E
Lemma 12. The k-modal optimum can be found in finite time. In fact it converges
- ------ ----- . ....... ................. --- -----  ..   .... .. .  ....
within O(m 4 k) time.
Proof. The k-modal equilibrium can be found in finite time because it is found by
optimizing over a finite space. Moreover, there are 4k unknowns in the problem.
Finding that involves 4k 'for loops' running from at most 1 to m due to which the
computational complexity is: O (m4k). E
Lemma 13. The optimal minority payoff for the k-modal problem is greater than
or equal to the minority payoff for strategies with less atoms than k. Consequently,
when the majority plays a k-modal strategy, the minority would have an incentive to
play a higher modal strategy. On the other hand, when the minority plays a k-modal
strategy, the majority has no incentive to play a higher modal strategy.
Proof. It is clear that the k-th modal solution is better for the minority than the
lower modal solutions, provided that the majority also plays at the same mode. This is
because that optimizing for k-th modal is a superset of optimizing for lower modes. So
we shall prove that that when the minority is using a k-atomic strategy ai, a2, . . ., ak
then the majority has no incentive to use a higher atomic strategy. Suppose for
instance that the majority uses a (k+1)-atomic strategy bi, b2, ... , bk+1. We have,
b1 > ai from the lemma earlier. In this case there exists some i E 2..k such that
bi and bi+1 both lie between (ai, ai+1). Clearly playing bi+ 1 is then wasteful, since
playing bi would have sufficed, and would have saved more votes. Thus, the majority
player would not play a k+1 modal strategy when the minority plays k-modal. E
A corollary for the above proposition is that, since we have provided an algorithm
to find the optimal solution to the bi-atomic case, we know it will perform better
than the current form of democracy which is the single atomic case. Similarly, if
we optimize for the tri-atomic case, it would perform at least as well the bi-atomic
optimum. However, it would be a case of diminishing marginal returns for increasing
computational complexity. In fact, it might happen, that after a point, increasing
the number of modes yield no improvement at all. The k-th modal equilibrium can
be found in a similar fashion as the algorithm described for the bimodal equilibrium,
except that it would involve an optimization with 4k variables. Thus, how a strategy
is to be used by the minority is decided according to the amount of computational
power available, and what the user considers to be the optimal value for computation.
Thus, we have outlined a method to get a Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
from among a restricted set of strategies, if all bills are identical. It is by no means
guaranteed to be the optimum among the set of mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium.
However, it does produce a significant improvement over the worst case unimodal
situation. We have also outlined some properties of the k-modal solutions.
3.2.2 Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Case
We can extend the perfect information version of the problem to the infinite horizon
to simplify the computations and get an idea of the properties of the solution. If we
extend the problem to the infinite horizon, the main change that happens is that the
total bids constraint translates into an average bid constraint. Also, mixing within
an auction and mixing between auctions lose their distinctions. Thus, we essentially
find a pair of mixed strategies which satisfy the average bid constraints, and are
used independently for each round. The problem reduces to that of finding two
opposing probability distribution functions (one for each player) such that the bid
for each player is drawn from that player's PDF. Suppose, if the mean of the PDF is
constrained to be a for player i, then the problem can be mathematically written as:
maxf minf,1 j fi(x)f 2 (y)dydx (3.11)
such that:
fi(x)dx = 1 (3.12)
fxfi(x)dx = ao (3.13)
fi(X) ;> 0 (3.14)
for i = 1 and 2. Also ai < a 2
This can be rewritten as:
maxf mihnf2 f fi(x)F2(x)dx
ffi(x)dx = 1
oxfi(x)dx = ai
00
10xF2(x)dz = ai,
fi(x) > 0
F2(oo) = 1
F2(X) = f2 (y)dy
The latter problem can be solved using the calculus of variations. We first write
out the augmented Lagrangian by incorporating the constraints into the cost function:
L = fi(x)F2(x) + Afi() + A2F2(x) + 1 3Xfi(x)dx + A4xF2(x)
Now, we merely write out the Lagrange equation for this, and solve for fi(x) and
f2(x). The Lagrange Equation gives us:
d&L L
dxOf' fi=0
and:
d 8L
dx OF2
aL
- =0
On solving these, we get:
F2(x) + A1 + A3 = 0
such that:
(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)
(3.18)
(3.19)
(3.20)
where:
(3.21)
-- (/2+ A4X) - fi(X) = 0dx
or,
F2 (x) = -/\ - k\x
fi(x) = 4
Finally, since f(x) = F2(x), we get:
f2(z) = -A3
Thus, the results seem to imply that the mixed strategy chosen should simply be
uniform distributions. However, it says nothing about the support for those distri-
butions. Since there is no way to find the support, we have to end up solving the
problem by discretizing it to probability mass functions outlined in Chapter 2. The
solution to the linear program formulated there gives the strategies that maximize
the minority payoff. Moreover, as we shall see, the strategies found as a solution to
this linear program comprise uniform distribution plus an extra probability mass at
0.
Now let us cover some definitions that are used in the following work. For a
k-modal problem, let us define the following:
Definition: Define S' as the set of k-modal strategies.
Definition: k-modal strategy for player 'i', s' E Sk, is given by support {ai, ..., a}
and the probability mass distribution corresponding to that support {pi, ... , pi }.
For the two player case, if player 2 is the majority player, we must have:
Moreover, such a strategy-pair 's', must satisfy the following problem:
n i-1
U1 = maxsimin,2 [pi(I(a', a2) + E pj)
i=1 j=1
such that
n
Z l ap = N1
i=1
n
ap= N2
i=1
1 2 > OVi
where,
n2
0~4~ if  ' > a 2
0.5 if a2
i=1
Now going back to the bimodal case, we can solve it easily and analytically, in the
infinite horizon situation. Mathematically, the problem is:
mnaXal,a2 ,PI,P2 mlib 1 ,b2 ,qi ,q2P2ql
such that,
alp, + a2P2 alO~
blql + b2q2  a2
Pi + P2=1
q p = 12
In the case of bimodal strategies, since the majority player has more virtual money
available, he can always outbid the minority player. Moreover, from similar arguments
on the modes of the finite horizon problem, we can set a, = 0, bi = 1, a2 = a,
= a+1. Furthermore, if P2 = p then, pw = i - p. Similarly, if q2 = qthen, q h = e-q.
On plugging these values into the original equations, the problem becomes:
maxa,Pminb,qp(1 - q)
such that,
ap = ai
aq = a2 -
Thus, q = 22-1p.
Plugging it into the objective function, we get an objective function solely with
respect to p. This can be differentiated and set to zero to obtain the maximizing p.
We get:
p* = - 12(a2 - 1)
This corresponds to an optimal minority expected payoff = P
The following figure below shows the plots of the finite versus infinite horizon
results for the bimodal optima.
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This result compares quite well with the result obtained earlier in the finite horizon
case, and reinforces the notion that solving the infinite horizon problem gives insight
into the solutions of the finite horizon problem.
Now, let us go back to the discussion of existence of mixed strategy equilibria. For
the infinite horizon formulation, we can say the following about equilibrium strategies
i.e. strategies where neither player has incentive to deviate.
Theorem 14. There exists no 'k' such that the k-modal strategy is an equilibrium. By
increasing or decreasing the support a better strategy can always be found. We define
a strategy pair to be in equilibrium if neither player has any incentive to deviate.
Mathematically,
Vk, s ={s12} E Sk x Sk, and p C (0, 1) - (2}, ] (New, 2 }
such that
Ui(s') > U1(s)
or
such that
U2(s') > U2(s)
Proof. We shall prove the above by using mathematical induction.
The result is trivial for k =1, since among unimodal strategies, the minority player
has zero payoff. Thus, he has an incentive to deviate to a bimodal strategy with one
of his modes set to a value larger than mode of the majority player.
Now suppose if possible that the statement is true for k = n but for k = n+1,
] s* = {sI, s 2} E Sn+1 x Sn+1 such that Ui(s*) > Ui(s') V s'. We know that
the strategy must have the following property (otherwise a better strategy can be
constructed which satisfies the following property):
Moreover, such a strategy-pair 's', must satisfy the following problem (the proof is
similar if I(aj, a') # 0 for any i):
n+I i-1
Ui (s*) = maximin,2 Z pl(Z p)
i=2 j=1
s.t.
n+1
p =1
i=
aspi =oa1i=11
n+1
i=1
n+1
2lIt 2
a p = a2
p1 2 >0Vi
On converting the above to the dual form, we get:
min r + ais
i-1
r+als > p V i E {1, 2,
j=1
n+1
22i=
n+1
a p2 a
...... , n + 1}
p 2 > V iE {1, 2, ...... , n +1}
Now let us fix the last elements of the support, i.e. a'+ 1 , a ±1 and their associated
probabilities, +2+ The optimum payoff should be the same even if the n+1-
th element of each strategy is fixed to the value it has in s*, and the optimization is
done over the remaining n elements of the strategies. Therefore, consider the resulting
subproblem (with p # 1) of the original problem obtained by fixing the last elements
of the supports. Note that it is always possible to choose n elements out of n+1
elements such that p # j.
mzn r + ais
i-1
r + as ;> E q V i E{1, 2, ...... , n}
j= 1
n
i=1
n
a 2P = 02
p > 0 V i {1, 2 ...... , n}
where:
2 = a 2 - a + +
2
2 Piqi 
- 2
1 n+1
r =
1 -pln+1
S
S =
=1 Pn+1
From the induction assumption, there exists a strategy that can improve this n-
modal subproblem. Thus, by applying the correct transformations to the improved
strategy in the subproblem, we can get a new strategy that improves the payoff
compared to s in the given n+1-modal problem. This is indeed a contradiction to the
induction step assumption, and thus if no equilibrium n-modal strategy exists, then
neither do equilibrium n+1-modal strategies. The proof is complete by the principle
of mathematical induction. E
Since no finite-modal equilibrium exists, we must look at strategies extending
towards an infinite support. For this purpose consider the set of strategies with
support {0,1.,n} as n goes to infinity, and look into the properties of the expected
payoff, as the size of the support increases. Essentially the mathematical formulation
for the problem where the support is increased is:
n i-1
Ui(s) = maxsiminS2 Zp1(0.5p2 + )
i=0 j=1
s.t.
n
pi=1
i=O
n
n
p1
i=O
n
i=O
pp 2 0 V iE{,1.,n}
Lemma 15. The minority payoff is non-decreasing with the size of the support.
Proof. When the size of the support increases, the above problem cast into the dual
form becomes:
min r + ais
r + is > 0.5pi + p V i E {0,1, 2 ...... , n +1}
j=0
n+1
i=O
n+1
i=0
p 2  Vi E {0, 1, 2, ...... , n+1}
Clearly, as the support increases to size n+1 for player 2, it restricts the feasible
set for the variables 'r' and 's' (due to an added constraint). Due to this, the new
feasible set is a subset of the original feasible set. As a result, the objective function
is non-decreasing. In fact it strictly increases if the new feasible set is a strict subset
of the original feasible set, and that happens if the new constraint is tight. That in
turn happens if p+ #0.
The following figure shows how the payoff changes with the support size.
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Figure 3-4: Minority Payoff vs. Support Size in Infinite Horizon
It is empirically observed that the minority payoff increases towards 1/2 as the
size of the support goes to infinity. The above figure was made for a game with
the minority fraction of 40%. As we can see, the minority payoff actually increases
strictly monotonically, which is a stronger condition than what was proved in Lemma
15. This monotonicity property allows us to use bisection search if we were to try
to find the optimum support size for which the payoffs are equitable. This would be
useful, if the auctioneer were to place limits on the size of the bids.
We also investigate the effects of changing the virtual money allocation by a
constant factor 'k'. The mathematical formulation corresponding to this is given by:
Ui(s) = max,lmin2 Zp'(0.5p2 + Z 2p)
i=0 j=1
such that
n
Zp= 1
n
Iip' < kio
i=0
n
p =
i=0
n
ip2 < ka2
i=0
p1 p 2 >OViE {o,1 ...., n}
Note that due to the nature of the game, the constraints 2 and 4 are actually tight.
The above problem can be recast in dual as:
mn z
z > r + kais
r +is > 0.5p2
i-1
+J: p ViE {O,1,2,
j=0
p =
i=0
n
ip2 < kaZ2
p2 OViC {,1,2, ...... , n}
We can prove the following properties of the expected payoff.
Lemma 16.
lim U(S) -
k-40 2
Proof. This is quite easy to prove, since by setting k = 0, the problem essentially
becomes:
mzn r
r + is > 0.5p2 + Sp 2V iE
j=0
n
i=0
{0,1,2, ...... , n}
nj p =0
i=0
p2 ;> 0 V i E {0, 1, ......, n}
Which forces p = 1, and p= 0 for] E {1, 2, ..., n}. This result reduces the problem
min r
r + is > 1 V i E{1, 2, .. ,} n
r > 0.5
Which clearly has the minimum given by r = 0.5. Thus,
lim U1(s) -
k-*O 2
Lemma 17. For every case of this problem, there exists a kmin such thatU1(s) <
P.
Proof. Essentially, if we select kmin = n/a 2 , discretization effects kick in and, the
resulting constraint affects the minority player more than than the majority player.
Due to this, the majority player gets a payoff disproportionate to his share. Here is
what happens: With k = n/a 2, the last constraint becomes:
n
Sip =n
i=0
This along with:
n
p =
i=0
forces the p?'s to become: p2 = 1, p2 = 1 V i < n As a result, the problem essentially
becomes:
U1(s) = maxiO.5p'
s.t.
n
i=0
n
E ip = nai/a2
i=0
p >OVi E {l, 2, ...., n}
Since we want to maximize p?, given the constraints, the best we can do is set
p = a/a 2, and pl = 0 V i E , 2, ..... , n - 1}, andpo = 1p - 1/a2 .
With that, we have: U1(s)|I k-=kfi = 2<p
Proof is complete by construction.
Theorem 18. For all cases of this problem, there exists a k = k*, such that U1(s)\k=k. =
P.
Proof. We first prove that as k increases U1(s)|k increases continuously with it.
Clearly, as k changes continuously, the polyhedron over which optimization occurs
changes continuously, and thus, the solution of the linear program changes contin-
uously. If we define h(k) = optimum solution of the given LP as a function of k,
then, from the above property, we know h(k) is continuous with k. Furthermore,
from Lemma 17 we have:
h(kmin) < p
And from Lemma 16 we have:
h(0) = 0.5
Finally, we appeal to the Intermediate Value Theorem to get I k = k* such that
U1(s)|k=k. -p. Ai
The following figure shows how the payoff changes with the allocation of virtual
money.
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Figure 3-5: Minority Payoff vs. Virtual Money Allocation in Infinite Horizon
We see that the properties that we proved in the Lemmas 16 and 17, are evident in
the above figure. This figure was made for a game with the minority fraction of 40%.
As we can see, the minority payoff actually decreases strictly monotonically, which is a
stronger condition than what was proved in Theorem 18. This monotonicity property
allows us to use bisection search if we were to try to find the optimum support size
for which the payoffs are equitable. In perfect information infinite horizon problems,
it is quite reasonable for the auctioneer to place limits on the size of the bids for each
.... . .... . ....  . .. ... .............
auction. From the properties observed, auctioneer has the option of either tuning the
maximum bid size itself or tuning the allocation of virtual money to get an equitable
resource allocation.
Moreover, in most cases, we face finite horizon problem. In the following section
we explicitly analyze the finite horizon problem. However, if we were to try to imple-
ment the infinite horizon strategy in the finite horizon we start running into problems.
The only way to do this and yet maintain some measure of performance is to have the
auctioneer artificially set a maximum bid constraint. The main reason we encounter
problems when implementing infinite horizon strategies in the finite horizon is that
in the finite horizon the set of feasible support shrinks as the bids are used. Setting
a low max bid constraint delays when the support starts shrinking enabling the infi-
nite horizon strategy to perform closer to the finite horizon optimum strategy. The
following section goes into further details on the computation and analysis of optimal
finite horizon strategies.
3.3 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for Auctions
with Different Valuations
So far we have analyzed the problem where all the auctions had the same valuations.
What happens when the auctions actually have different valuations. This effectively
makes the problem much more complicated since the probability distribution from
which the value is selected now depends on the number of votes remaining and the
current value of the item. However, it turns out, some analytical work can be done if
there are two items and two players.
Consider the simplified case of a two players and a two stage game. Let the two
objects be valued at (pi, qi) and (P2, q2) by the two players respectively. Also, if the
number of votes available to the two players are Ni and N2 (assuming Ni < N 2), let
us denote the PDFs of the mixed strategy in the first round to be fi and f2. We can
easily establish that [0, N1] and [0, N2] are valid supports for the two players. Now, if
x1 and £2 are the actual number of votes cast during the first round, then the number
of votes cast in the second round is fixed to N1 - x1 and N 2 - £2. Now the expected
payoffs of the first player for a given element in its support is given by:
UI(X1) = pIP(x2 < Xi) + p 2P(N 2 - X2 <N 1 - £1)
pIP(x2 < Xi) + p 2P(X2 > N2 - Ni + 1)
pIF 2(Xi) + P2 - p 2F2 (N 2 - Ni + X1)
Where A = N2 - N1.
Applying the incentive compatibility condition, i.e. the expected payoffs over the
elements of the support are equal and more than the expected payoffs of elements not
in support, we must have:
p1F 2 (X) - p2F2 (A + X)= constant Vx C [0, N1] (3.22)
Thus, plugging in x=O in the original equation:
U1 = P2(1 - F2(A)) (3.23)
Similarly by applying the same conditions on the expected payoff of the second player,
we get:
qiF 1(x) - q2F1(X - A) = constant Vx C [0, N2] (3.24)
We now impose the boundary conditions to this problem. Since the supports are
[0, N1] and [0, N2] respectively. We must have:
F2 (0) = 0, F2 (N2 ) = 1 (3.25)
F1 (0) = 0, F1(N1) = 1 (3.26)
Now using this fact, along with the equation 2.1 at x=0, we can get:
pIF 2(0) - P2F2(A) = c
c = p2F2(A)
Then, for successive values of x, we compute the value of F2(x + A) according to eqn
3.22. Accordingly, we get:
p1F2(A) - P2F2 (2A) = P2 F2 (A)
F(2A) = P P2 F2(A)
P2 ( 1) F2(A)
Define: A = '. Then we have:
P2
F(2A) = (A - 1)F2(A)
Similarly, applying Equation 3.22 to F2(kA) we get:
p1 F2 (kA) - P2F2 ((k + 1)A) = P2F2 (A)
F2((k + 1)A) = AF2(kA) - F 2(A)
Using the above equation, we can inductively show that:
F 2 (kA) = [Ak-i - Ak-2 - ...... - 1]F2 (A)
Now, one condition for a CDF is that it must be non-decreasing.
(3.27)
Using that for
the above equation, we get the following lemma:
Lemma 19. For F2(kA), given by Equation 3.27, to always increase with k, we must
have A > 2.
Proof. For F2 (kA) to always increase with k, we must have:
F2((k + 1)A) > F2 (k) V k E W
Thus,
[Ak - Ak-1 - ...... - 1]F 2 (A)
[Ak _Ak-i.... ~ 1]
_ [A 1 - Ak- 2 - ...... - 1]F 2 (A)
....- 1]
A > 2
QED.
Moving on with the analysis of the majority player's strategy, let us define:
n =
Then, nX < N2 < (n + I1)A.
And thus, we must have:
F2 (nA) < F2 (N 2 ) = 1
Combining this with Equation 3.27 we get:
F 2 (A) < (3.28)
....-1]
Recall, from Equation 3.23, that U1 = P2(I - F2 (A)). Since the majority player tries
to minimize the minority player's payoff, he will choose a PDF such that F2(A) is
maximized. From Equation 3.28, we know that the maximum value that F2 (A) can
take is:
F2 (nA) = [ A - -An- 2 ...... _ 1]
Thus, to minimize minority payoff, the majority will simply choose a PDF where this
happens. And accordingly, we get:
1
U = P2 (I- [An- A- - (3.29)
Now we provide a better picture of the majority player's CDF. Essentially, when
we set F2(nA) < F2(N 2) = 1, we get a set of cascading constraints from the incentive
compatibility condition. Those constraints are of the form: F2(kA) < F2 (N2 - (n -
k)A). Moreover, we had a boundary condition of F2 (0) = 0.
Thus, any function that has value F2 (x) = 0 for x E [0, N2 - nA], and then is non-
decreasing till A, where it takes the value F2(A) = 1/[A"-' - n-2 - ...... - 1] satisfies
all the conditions for the CDF and is an optimal strategy for the majority player. It
can then be propagated forwards to get its values from [A, N 2]. The following figure
shows one such optimal CDF for the majority player.
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Figure 3-6: One possible optimal strategy in two-player two-stage game
The same procedure is repeated to obtain the strategy for the minority player
from the other incentive compatibility equation. One interesting point to note here
is that by tuning the allocation of the virtual money, the size of the parameter A
....... .. - -_____- -- _
...... 
_ i )
is changed. However, despite that the parameter n does not change. In fact if the
minority fraction given by p, then n = [P. This in turn gives a fixed value for
U*. Thus for a given p, the equilibrium payoff of the minority is fixed and cannot be
tuned by the allocation of virtual money. This phenomenon is observed even in the
multi-stage games we will discuss next. Moreover, as p increases, we can easily see
from Equation 3.29, that U* increases in a step-wise manner. This is again observed
in multi-stage games. Let us, then, move on to the investigation of these multi-stage
games.
So far we have provided analytical an solution to the two-player two stage game. It
has provided us with some insight into the finite horizon behavior of this mechanism.
Let us see if these properties hold for the general m-stage game. In the 2-player n-
stage game, the total available bids decrease with each stage, so the available support
decreases. Thus, we need to find a mixed-strategy for each stage of the game. We do
it by casting the problem as Dynamic Program, where each stage of the DP computes
the optimal PMFs for the auction corresponding to that stage. Thus, there the total
number of stages correspond to the total number of auctions.
We write out the DP as follows. Let Xk =[ai, a 2] be the vector containing the
votes remaining of player 1 and 2 at the k - 1th stage. At the k"h stage, the number
of votes used by the players are given by Uk [ni, n2]. Clearly, ni can only take
values between [0, a1]. Similarly, n2 can only take values between [0, a 2]. Now, let us
define the set of strategies (st) for each player i at each stage k. The strategy s' is
defined over the support [0, aj] with the associated set of probabilities {p} | . The
probability mass function has the usual constraint of pj > 0, Ej p' = 1V i. The cost
function is the expected utility of player 1 till stage k, given by Uk(x). This is what
is optimized during each recursion of the Bellman's equation. Moreover, since each
recursion corresponds to a separate auction, there are a total of 'm' stages in the DP.
We thus write the DP as:
U'([ai, a 2]) = v'J(ai, a 2)
U2([ai, a 2]) =max.1 min s2 Enisin2es 2 {v I(ni, n2) + U'+1([ai - ni, a2 - n2])
1 if a > b
I(a, b) = 0.5 if a = b
0 if a < b
On fully writing out the Bellman equation in terms of the probability variables
we get:
Uk([ai, a 2]) = maxpjMtmn 2
such that,
ol 02
p_{vI(ni, n2) + Uk,+1([ai - ni, a2- n 2 ])
n1=0 n2=0
p = IV i E {l,2}
j=0
pj > 0 V i C {, 2, j E {0, 1,...,a}
Finally the max-min version of the problem can be cast into just a minimization
problem by taking the dual of maximization half. The resulting problem is:
Ukl([ai, a 2]) = r
such that,
r- ; mi p {Vo I(i, ) + Uo+1([ai -, 2 - j])Vi
j=0
j=0
j p > 0 V j E (o, 1, ...,I ai}
On solving this DP, we can obtain the optimum mixed strategy for the m-stage
game. Some of the results obtained by solving this DP is plotted below: In Figure
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Figure 3-7: Effects of Minority Payoff vs. Minority Fraction
3-7 we plot the effects of the minority fraction on the minority payoff. As we can see
here the minority payoff increases with p in a discrete manner. This matches quite
well with the behavior found in the two stage game. In Figure 3-8 we investigate
the effects of the problem horizon on the solution characteristics. As we increase
the horizon of the game, the solution appears to be converging to some value. It is
expected that as the horizon goes towards infinity, this will converge to a value of 0.15
which is the equitable payoff in the infinite horizon for this game. This essentially
indicates, that the infinite horizon results would hold if the horizon of the problem
(m) is sufficiently large. On the other hand, for short horizon games, some properties
like being able to tune payoff by allocating virtual money seems to break down.
.............
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Chapter 4
Applications
In this chapter we present the main applications of the all-pay auction model that
we presented and analyzed in previous chapters. We explore applications in political
science and resource allocation. In particular, we describe applications to the problem
of designing an equitable democratic system and to the problem of allocating resources
in a battlefield. Another application of this mechanism is in the field of boardroom
decision making, which is identical to our analysis of the democratic systems. We
first mathematically model these problems in an all-pay auction framework and then
apply our mechanism to them. Lastly, we use the results obtained in Chapter 3 in
the context of these applications.
4.1 An Equitable Democracy
Democracy has been hailed as a system that epitomizes equal access to power, and
champions fairness and freedom. However, there are still major limitations in the
current form of democracy; it is still possible for a minority to be subject to the
"tyranny of the majority". If the majority decided to band together and take decisions
that adversely affected the minority, there is nothing the minority can do about it.
There exists no mechanism to enable minorities to get bills passed in their favor.
Thus, minorities can feel disenfranchised if most the of the decisions and benefits go
in favor of the majority. Our mechanism presents an alternate model of democracy
that gives minorities a chance to have some say in the legislative process, and allows
them to get some bills passed in their favor.
As opposed to winner take all form of voting, more equitable forms of voting like
proportional representation or even cumulative voting have been adopted in many
countries including most of Europe. However, these forms of voting ensure that the
representation in the parliament or the house of representatives is more attuned to
the proportion of people's votes, however, it does not help the minority get actual
bills passed in the parliament. Our proposed system is a variant of the cumulative
voting system, but applied to the case of actual voting in parliament. In the next
section we shall describe our system, and model the process mathematically. Finally
we shall analyze the system, and show that it indeed does yield an equitable result.
In fact, we shall show that the expected payoff of a party under the new system, is
proportional to its fraction of the total seats. Thus, this system coupled with pro-
portional representation, could ensure that each minority gets benefits proportional
to its fraction of the population. In other words, a true Equitocracy.
4.1.1 Modeling Equitocracy
In a House of Representatives or a Parliament, suppose there are 'n' members. In the
current system, all of them vote exactly once per bill, and since the composition of
the house changes only once per election cycle, the majority party can always win all
the bills during this duration, if all the party members vote uniformly. In the British
parliamentary system, parties ensure voting according to the party strategy by issuing
a whip, whereby, party members need to vote according to their party's strategy, or
risk getting expelled. In the American system, they can decide individually whether
to vote for or against a bill, but the parties comprise of people who have similar
stances on certain core issues, so they tend to vote according to the party lines in
bills concerning those core issues. In fact, most of the mature democracies have
stabilized to a system with two major parties. Thus it is reasonable to model the
Parliament or the House of Representatives as consisting of two players: a majority
party and a minority party, all of whose members vote uniformly.
Moreover, if each party represents a social group and acts in their interest, then,
the majority party, and hence the majority group, will always win in the current sys-
tem. We want to devise a system where even the minority group can win sometimes.
To do so, consider a system where each member is allowed a quota of 'in' bills per
year. Thus, there can only be up to mn bills in the house any given year. Naturally,
each member is given a total of mn votes for the entire year, with the difference that
he can cast multiple or even zero votes for a given bill, as long as he does not exceed
his limit of votes for the year.
First of all, suppose the fraction of the minority party in the house is p. Then the
total votes available to it is pn 2m and the number of bills it can propose is pnm. On
the other hand, the majority party has (1 - p)n 2 m votes and can propose (1 - p)nm
bills. Now, let vi denote the payoff from the bill to the social group that the bill's
author represents, then v is the payoff of the other group. The value of the payoffs
are known only when the bills are brought before the parliament, and, in the following
sections, we do analysis for the both cases when that information is either public or
private.
Since each party tries to act in the interest of the social group it represents, and
since the party members follow the party directives, it is reasonable to assume that
the party will select only those bills for which vi > 0 when authoring a bill. For the
purpose of our analysis, we shall consider only the bills for which v i < 0, since if
v_i > 0 then the other party has no incentive to cast any votes to oppose the bill,
and the Nash Equilibrium is trivially to not cast votes. Alternately we can exclude
this case under the justification that since we usually operate close to a Pareto Front,
it is not possible to have gains for everyone. Usually benefits for some come at the
cost of losses for others. So, due to the above line of reasoning, we only consider bills
where vi > 0 and v-i < 0.
Based on our description of operating on a Pareto Front, we can model the re-
lationship between vi and vi as follows: 0 > vi = c(vi) (Vvi > 0). Where c is a
monotonically decreasing, invertible function. Also, we must have c(0) = 0. Finally,
it is reasonable to assume that the values of vi are restricted to the set (0, U]. Then
vi take values from [c(U), 0).
4.1.2 More on Modeling Bills
In our discussion above, we modeled the bill by its value to both parties. However, we
did not describe how this value is obtained. There are certain nuances to modeling
how we obtain the value, which are discussed in this subsection. There are two ways
to model the value of a bill corresponding to what happens in reality. We classify the
bills as either proactive or reactive, according to whether the values for the bill are
selected by the author of the bill or by some external agency.
Proactive Bills
Some bills proposed by the members of the house are proactive bills, where the bill
author takes the initiative in trying to legislate issues important to him. In these kinds
of bills, the author tailors the bill to yield the social payoff that he desires. Clearly,
in these bills, he will try to maximize the payoff to his constituents. However, that
might adversely impact some other social group. If the bill ends up significantly
hurting the interests of the other party, the two parties will engage in a bitter contest
and ultimately the bill with go to the party that is willing to commit more votes
to it. So, modeling proactive bills is in two parts: first choosing the payoffs of the
two parties, which then becomes public information, and then selecting the number
of votes to cast on it, when it is introduced on the floor of the house. An example
of a proactive bill would be the issue of quota for government jobs, where a certain
percentage of government jobs could be reserved for minorities. Here, the author of
the bill in effect chooses the value by setting the percentage of jobs that are reserved.
This kind of a bill has been quite controversial in Indian politics, where politicians
have somehow raised the minority quota to 49.5% of total government jobs.
Among proactive bills, we have two ways of modeling them. In one, we assume
the values for the bills can always be selected from a given range. The other way
of modeling it is a bit more realistic, where we assume that the proactive bills are
on topics mentioned in the election manifesto's of the parties. Thus, there is only
a discrete set of values that the bills can take, and once those values are selected,
future bills can no longer take those values. It then becomes a problem of selecting
the sequence of bills brought forth before the house from among a set of bills. As we
shall show later, this becomes equivalent to the problem of auctioning a fixed number
of items in a sequential manner.
Reactive Bills
The other kind of bills would be reactive bills, wherein the legislators react to some
external event. A good example of such an event would be an external terror attack
which led to the Patriot's Act in the US, and a similar attack which led to Prevention
Of Terrorism Act in the India. Other examples would be the stimulus packages
introduced by almost all countries during the most recent recession. In these cases,
since the bill is in response to an external event, the payoffs are determined largely
by the external factors, and not so much by the author of the bill. These kinds
of bills can be modeled as bills with payoffs determined by independent identically
distributed random variables following some distribution determined from historical
data on such bills. So, here during each round, a bill is introduced, whose payoffs
are randomly drawn and that information can either be public or private. The main
decision in this model is to choose the votes to be cast in each round. There can
be two variants of this model: a perfect information scenario, where each party has
full knowledge of the valuation of the bill by the other party, while in the imperfect
information case, the actual value of the opponent's valuation is not known, but the
distribution it is drawn for is known. Example of the perfect information valuation
would be things which are objective and can be evaluated easily, like the payoffs of
a stimulus package or the effects of changing the interest rate. On the other hand
imperfect information arises where subjective intangibles are involved. An example of
this would be controversial issues, where people have emotional value attached to the
outcomes of the bill. This can happen for issues like gay marriage or child abortion.
Although we have tried to cast our model of bills into proactive and reactive
partitions, the reality is actually a mix of both. Most bills are in part reactive and in
part proactive. So, we can actually select the payoff to a certain extent, but there is
still an element of stochasticity in the actual payoff received, due to the circumstances.
However, for the purpose of analysis, it is easier to cover the cases of proactive and
reactive bills, and then try to draw conclusions on the general situation. Additionally,
it is even more realistic to model payoffs that are constrained by the Pareto front.
4.1.3 Voting on Bills
Now that we have described our model for the bills, what happens after a bill is
brought forth before the house? Once a bill is introduced, both the parties vote on it
as a strategic form game. Since, we are considering only those bills with adversarial
payoffs, both parties have an incentive to vote. Let the number of votes cast by the
party proposing the k-th bill be nik , and the opposing party be nk Moreover, the
proposing party shall vote in favor of the bill, while the opposing party shall vote
against it. If n k > nk j, the bill gets passed and both the parties get payoffs equal to
the value of the bill to that party. On the other hand, if, nik < nki, then the bill fails,
and both get a payoff of zero. If the votes are tied, the speaker of the house, usually
casts his vote and that can be modeled as the result of a fair coin toss. This process
is repeated mn times for the mn bills passed through the parliament in a given year.
Mathematically, we write the payoff function of the strategic form game modeling
the voting of a bill as:
k i v~ ~ vi if ri > Thj,
uf (vi, ni, v_j, n-j) = ii ->n
0 if ni < n_.
and
k~ v0 ~ if m, > rij,U-i (vi, ni, v-i , n-j)=
v-i if ni < n.
Moreover, the constraints on the number of votes can be written as:
mn
N1 = En = pn2 m
k=1
mn
N2 = ri = (1 - p)n2 m
k=1
nk > o , n k 0
Finally, the overall payoffs are given by:
mn
U1 = U
k=1
mn
U2 = Z u2
k=1
If the current form of democracy is used for this game, the final payoff will be
U1 = (1 - p)c(U)mn for the minority and U2 = (1 - p)Umn for the majority. Let us
see if the minority can get a better payoff in Equitocracy.
4.1.4 Does Minority do better in Equitocracy?
In this section we show how this kind of a system allows Minority to do a little better.
In what follows A (p) refers to the expected additional utility gained by the minority
under the new system. In essence, it is the improvement in minority's payoff compared
to the worst case payoff. Note that although this result follows from Theorem 1 in
Section 2.1.1, we present a proof here from first principles to illustrate the specificities
in this application.
A (p) = E{U1 } - (1 - p)c(U)mn
Proposition 20. Vp E (0, 1/2), 3 a strategy {n }"_ such that A (p) > 0.
Proof. We prove this by construction. All available strategies of the majority party
have at least one round (k) with nik < (1 - p)n votes. Consider any strategy of the
minority in which one of the rounds (1) is randomly selected and is assigned votes
n [(1 - p)n, pnm]. (The closed brackets are correctly defined for p > 1 1 But
1+mn
if we consider the fact that p is merely the proportion of the minority in the house,
then we immediately see that it is always true since p > i > 1.) Thus, this
strategy has a non-zero probability of winning over all of the available strategies of
the majority player, and the expected payoff is more than the worst-case payoff where
minority always loses. Thus, E{U1} > (1 - p)c(U)mn, and thereby A (p) > 0. 1
Now, that we know that A (p) > 0, we want to maximize it. Because of this, we
we are interested in finding the Nash Equilibria of this game, and see, if we can find
the subgame perfect equilibrium that maximizes the minority's expected payoff. In
the next section wherein we analyze the bills, we shall first mathematically look at
the proactive bills, and then at the reactive bills. We will use the results obtained in
Section 3 and apply directly to obtain strategies that can achieve equity in democracy.
For the proactive case, we describe an algorithm to numerically evaluate a mixed
strategy Nash Equilibrium among a class of strategies. While for the reactive section,
there is a need to consider two cases depending on whether the parties have perfect
or imperfect information. i.e, whether the knowledge of each party's valuation of the
bill is public or private. Using results from Section 3, we find a closed form pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium for the reactive imperfect information case, while we show
that the perfect information case, has no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. However,
we find a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium for it.
4.2 Equitable Democracy Analysis
In this section, we seek to analyze optimal voting strategies for the minority for all
the previously discussed types of bills. We do this by modeling the problem as an
all-pay auction. By doing so, we seek to exploit the pre-existing literature of auction
theory. Finally, we describe the equilibrium strategies for the proactive, and reactive
bills.
4.2.1 Modeling as an All-Pay Auction
We now describe how the problem of optimal voting, given a payoff, can be trans-
formed into a problem of repeated all-pay auctions with virtual currency. The resource
of votes that a party is assigned can be exactly modeled as virtual currency, given
the fact that the votes have no value after the conclusion of a season of Parliament.
Moreover, on an average, the minority party gets pn votes per bill, and the majority
party gets (1 - p)n votes per bill.
Consider the case of reactive bills, and as discussed, we can restrict ourselves to
bills with adversarial payoffs. Let U' and ' be the payoffs of the ith bill for the
minority and majority, respectively. Without loss of generality, assume ut < 0 and
U' > 0. Given that the only possibilities for a bill are to be passed or blocked, the
majority gets a payoff of u' if the bill is passed and a minority gets a payoff of -u'
if the bill is blocked. The payoff of -u' for the minority can be motivated by the
fact that the minority is preventing a loss of u' by blocking the bill. Therefore,
the process of voting for a bill with payoffs { ui, U'}can be seen as auctioning for an
item worth {-U3, u} to the majority and minority, respectively. We also refer to
the values {--ui, uI} as the effective utility of the bill to the minority and majority,
repectively.This auction would be of all-pay nature, as once the votes are used, they
cannot be reused. The proactive case can similarly be modeled as an all-pay auction,
once the payoffs have been selected. Thus, the parliamentary process can be modeled
as a repeated all pay auction. Now we can talk about the strategies the parties can
use to vote. One set of strategies that can be readily applied are Nash Equilibria
since they, by definition, are situated at the local optima. The following subsection
describes some properties of the Nash Equilibrium for the different kinds of bills.
4.2.2 Existence of Nash Equilibria
Firstly, we would like to note that in the case of the proactive bills, and the perfect
information reactive bills, both parties have complete information on their own valu-
ations and the valuations of their opponents. Therefore by Theorem 10, there doesn't
exist any pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for the parties.
Theorem 21. If the valuations of each bill are known to all parties, then there exists
no Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium with A(p) > 0.
Proof. By a direct application of Theorem 10, the result follows. Z
Now for the imperfect information reactive bills, due to the uncertainty in the
knowledge of the opponents values, it is actually possible to get a pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium.
Theorem 22. There exists a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the Imperfect
Information Reactive Case.
Proof. Follows from the fact that the optimal voting problem with imperfect infor-
mation can be modeled as a repeated all-pay auction. The results then follow from
[20) and [21].
4.2.3 Proactive Bills
Now we consider the case of the proactive bills. From Theorem 21, described above,
we know that we need to search for a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium for this model
of democracy, if we want to improve payoff of the minority. The problem here is
harder than the problem for reactive bills since here we have to select both the vi and
then also the number of votes to cast in each round. We can readily see that if the
minority party decides to pool all its votes together and cast it all on one randomly
selected bill, it has a very high probability of winning it. Essentially what this is
doing is creating a biatomic support for the number of votes in each round with the
modes being 0 and all the votes. We now proceed as in Section 3, and consider the
set of all strategies with biatomic support, to find a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium
using the algorithm described in Section 3.2.1. We formulate an iterative algorithm,
motivated by the one in Section 3.2.1, to compute the optimal values of two the
atoms from the set of all biatomic strategies. Let (a, p) and (b, q) be the 'atoms' in
the strategies of the minority and majority, respectively. The values of a and b stand
for the number of votes cast for (mn-p) and (mn-q) bills by the minority and the
majority, respectively. The remaining votes for each party are equally distributed
among the remaining p and q bills, respectively. If the minority selects p bills among
the mn bills and the majority selects q, then consider the event that there are exactly
r bills in the intersection of the two selections. The value F(p,q,r) is the probability
of such an event. In the definitions that follow, U1 and U2 are the normalized utilities
of the minority and majority, assuming that all bills are identical. We also define ni
which stands for the number of votes that go into the p bills that minority selects.
n2 is defined in the same manner.
Solve,
p= argmaxPEW{U1(p)}
where,
p
Ui(p) = (p - r) F (p, q, r)
r-O
S p!q!(mn - p)!(mn - q)!
mn!(mn + r - p - q)!r!(p - r)!(q - r)!
with,
q = (1-p)mn2-m-a
a = P'"2
and once p* is found we have: a* = §"
b* = a* + 1
q* (1-p~mn2-m-a-I L P 2 m  * j
c* = 0
d= 1
Clearly, the optimal value of n2(b, q) obtained will be greater than that of n 1(a, p),
as the majority has the ability to cast a larger number of votes to counter the minority.
In fact, in the optimal case, we find that for a given value of ni(a, p), the optimal
value for the majority would be n2 (b, q) = ni(a, p) + 1, as this would be enough
to counter the minority's votes. This fact enables us to design such a simple and
efficient algorithm. Now that we have an algorithm for finding a mixed strategy Nash
Equilibrium, let us try to characterize some properties of the following algorithm.
Theorem 23. The above algorithm converges to an optimum in finite time. In fact
it converges within O(mn) iterations.
Proof. The algorithm converges to the optimum by construction. The algorithm ends
only when we reach points (a*, p*) and (b*, q*) such that
p* = argmax,{U1 (p, q(p, a*, b*))}
and
q* = q(p*, a* b*),
which is clearly a Nash Equilibrium among bimodal strategies, since neither party
has an incentive to deviate from it.
The algorithm converges in finite time as the values can only take discrete values.
The maximum number of steps is just O(mn) since the arg-max loop takes O(mn)
number of steps. This gives the total running time of the algorithm. D
Thus, we have outlined a method to get a Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
from among a restricted set of strategies, if all bills are identical. It is by no means
guaranteed to be the optimum among the set of mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium.
However, it does produce a significant improvement over the worst case situation.
Now let us try to generalize this, and describe some properties of the generalized
case. These properties follow from Lemmas 11, 12 and 13 presented in Section 3. If we
choose a support of k-atoms instead of 2 atoms described above, we get the k-atomic
problem. The k-atomic problem essentially describes a situation where the minority
casts from among ai, a2, .... , ak votes for the bills, while the majority party casts from
among bi, b2 .... , bk votes for the bills. The only constraint is that the total number
of votes spent by each party should not exceed the number they have available. As
we can see this is a combinatorial optimization problem, and the number of possible
allocations increases significantly with the number of atoms. We present the following
properties of the k-modal problem.
Proposition 24. The optimal solution to the k-atomic problem performs at least as
well as all the problems with less atoms than k.
A corollary for the above proposition is that, since we have provided an algorithm
to find the optimal solution to the bi-atomic case, we know it will perform better
than the current form of democracy which is the single atomic case. Similarly, if
we optimize for the tri-atomic case, it would perform at least as well the biatomic
optimum. However, it would be a case of diminishing marginal returns for increasing
computational complexity.
4.2.4 Reactive Bills
Now we shall consider the reactive case. As mentioned earlier, we will investigate two
variants of the reactive case: with perfect information, and with imperfect informa-
tion. Based on Theorem 2, we need to search for a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium
for the perfect information variant. On the other hand, from Theorem 3, we have
a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for the imperfect information case. Let us first
consider the situation with imperfect information.
Imperfect Information
Reactive bills are those that are proposed as a reaction to some external event, and
hence can be seen to have a payoff determined by a random external event. We model
this by assuming that the payoff of the ith reactive bill is a random variable Xi with
a CDF F, i.e. P (Xi < x) = F (x). Thus the optimal voting problem exactly reduces
to that of an optimal bidding problem for repeated all-pay auctions, where at each
step, an object is put up for auction whose worth is given by a random variable. For
the case of imperfect information, i.e. when the other party's valuation of the bill is
not known, we appeal to Lemma 5 to obtain the following result.
Lemma 25. The Nash Equilibrium bidding function for the two parties are given by:
f* (V = c
f2* = cV2)+l
where,
-2+ - -- 2 + ( 1 )
and,
c=1+ (2p-1)2 +p(1-p)
Proof. From Reference [20], we get the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium as:
f*(x) = cxY+1l f2*(x) = cX +
where -y and c are given by:
f*(x)dx = p I 1f2*(x)dx = I - p
On solving these, we get the results of our lemma.
Theorem 26. When the payoffs of the bills are i. i.d uniform, then there exists a
bidding strategy for the minority that gaurantees a total payoff fraction of p.
Proof. By using the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Lemma 6, as the strategy, the
expected effective payoff for both the minority (U*) and the majority (U2*) can be
calculated. We find that:
U* =
pmnU
1I + -(2p - 1)2 + p(1 - p)
U* = (1 - p)mnU
2 1+ (2p 
- 1)2 + p(1 - p)
From this we can clearly see that the payoffs are in direct proportion of the fraction
1
7 - 1
of seats.
Another interesting property derived in [20] is that U* + U2* is at least 3/4 of the
social payoff if every bill was just assigned to the party that valued it more.
Perfect Information
We finally cover the case of Perfect Information Reactive Bills. In this case, all the
parties have the knowledge of the other party's payoff from the bill. This allows us to
rule out the possibility of a pure strategy equilibrium by Theorem 21. For this case
we can show that if the players were to mix within a game, instead of mixing between
the games, as discussed in the proactive case, then the only possible mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium would have A(p) = 0. This result follows from the condition that
all elements of support in MSNE must have same expected payoff. Such an outcome
happens, for instance, when the parties have no information on the nature of payoffs
of future bills and they consider every bill to be the last bill. In a more realistic case,
the problem can be modeled as a sequential all-pay auction with budgeted bidders,
and we have been unable to find any related literature. Therefore, this is a quite open
area for future work. Moreover, the solution of Proactive case is tied quite closely
to the solution of the perfect information Reactive case. Any breakthrough in either
would help tremendously in finding solutions for the other.
4.3 Battlefield Decision Making
In Chapter 1, we motivated our problem of designing a mechanism for equitable
resource allocation with a battlefield example. The problem involved equitable al-
location of limited resources to the teams in the field. This is actually a very real
world problem with the current wars going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem
of deciding how many resources are assigned to high priority missions, like capturing
Osama bin Laden, vis-a-vis the allocation to the lower priority missions, like locating
a weapons cache, is a problem that the military planners face every day.
In the battlefield example, we made a case for the use of a decentralized mechanism
which can do equitable resource allocation. While making the case we argue that
in a battlefield communications can be of low bandwidth and potentially insecure,
so it may not be possible to convey the full situational awareness to a centralized
planner. However, sending just the bid for each auction is feasible even when there is
low bandwidth. Moreover, if the communication line were compromised, the enemy
wouldn't be able to ascertain much about the situational awareness of the team from
just a bid.
The mechanism we proposed involved allocation virtual money (proportional to
the mission priority) to each team and then auctioning off the items sequentially in
an all-pay format. The allocation constraint would depend on time-horizon of the
problem. If the horizon is fixed and finite, then there would be a total bid constraint.
This can happen when there are finite number of resources to be auctioned. On the
other hand, if the time horizon for the missions is not fixed, and there are replenishable
resources, like time-slots for satellite images or UAVs, then it makes sense to model
the situation as an infinite horizon problem. In that case, it we need to impose an
average bid constraint on the players.
The downside of the supposition of poor communication is that each team has
no idea on the situation of the other teams. So they do not know how much the
other teams value the current resource. However, it is quite reasonable to assume
that the current valuation of the resource for each player is drawn from some known
distribution. For example, one team may be under heavy enemy fire so they may
value the air strike highly. Although other teams may not know that this team is
under heavy fire, they can estimate the probability of this happening. Thus, each
player can generate a prior distribution of the other players' valuations. Due to it,
this situation looks quite a lot like the imperfect information case.
Moreover, the resources in the modern battlefield include items satellites and
UAVs which can be used on time-share basis. Thus we can keep auctioning off time
slots for these resources in an infinite horizon. Even resources like air strikes as
somewhat replenishable because the aircraft can just return to the base, get refueled
and rearmed and then perform another airstrike. Lastly, the duration of many of
the missions are not known and depend on the events that occur during the mission.
Since sequential auctions continue as long as the mission is going on, we essentially
have the infinite horizon situation we analyzed in Chapter 3.
4.3.1 Modeling Battlefield Resource Allocation
Based on the description given above, we can model the battlefield resource allocation
problem as a infinite horizon imperfect information problem. Let there be n the
number of teams in the battlefield. The mission priority looks like a reasonable metric
in this situation for deciding the fairness of the allocation. Let team i have priority
pi. Then define ai = . We would, therefore, want our allocation for player i
to be proportional to ai. Let us allocate a total average of N votes per round such
that the average bidding constraint of each player is Ni = Nai. Furthermore, we can
assume that the valuations xi of each player are drawn from a uniform distribution
over [0,1]. If they are not drawn from a unit distribution but instead from [0, V],
then we can just normalize by setting yi = xi/V and use y for the problem. We are
now in a position to use our results from the previous chapter to this situation. We
know that there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibria for this game, and can easily
compute the bidding functions of each player that gives them an equitable payoff. We
do so in the next section.
4.3.2 Battlefield Resource Allocation Analysis
From Chapter 3, we can apply Theorem 7 with the bidding constraints of the players
set at Nai and the valuations at yi. Then, the pure strategy is given by:
f*(xi) = cNp x.z;=1 Pj
where:
c
= -- 1
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And c is the solution to:
c - ai
Moreover, by following this strategy the expected payoff of each player is guaranteed
to be:
piv
j=1 Pi
Thus this allocation yields payoffs proportional to the mission priority just like the
military headquarters would have desired. In fact this can be reused even for finite
horizon versions of the problem if the horizon is sufficiently long and we are willing
to tolerate some performance degradation.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Conclusion
Auction theory is a very interesting topic which studies mechanisms of various for-
mats for buying and selling goods. There are all kinds of mechanisms covered in the
ambit of auction theory, ranging from sealed bid auctions like first-price or second
price auctions, to open/called bid auctions like the English or Dutch auctions. One
interesting kind of auction is the all-pay auction, in which, as the name suggests, all
the players pay their bids whether they win the item or not. Analysis of all-pay auc-
tions with virtual money has so far been neglected in the auction theory literature.
However, it can be used to design a mechanism with a wide variety of applications
including equitable resource allocation, and fairer systems for legislation and corpo-
rate management. In this thesis, we presented this novel mechanism, analyzed it in a
game-theoretic framework and considered the variants of the problem including the
perfect and imperfect information cases. Furthermore, we outlined how to find the
equilibrium bidding strategies for this mechanism which lead to equitable distribution
of resources.
The problem of equitable distribution of limited resources is encountered in many
fields. It is often necessary to allocate objects among different people according to
some criterion like need or priority. We defined equitable allocation to mean an allo-
cation of resources that is commensurate with some user desired metric. For example,
in a disaster relief situation, the objective of an aid agency might be to distribute
supplies to the victims in order of their need, with larger families allocated more food
than smaller families. Similarly, in a battlefield the central command allocates re-
sources, to all the teams on the ground, commensurate with their mission needs and
priorities. In this thesis, we showed how our all-pay auction based mechanism can be
used to allocate the resources in the desired manner. Moreover, even the concept of
voting in the parliament or decisionmaking in a corporate board room can thought
of as a resource allocation problem. Here the 'resource' being allocated is the par-
liamentary bill or the board decision. Currently, a party needs just more than 50%
of seats in the legislature to control 100% of the bills. Similarly, a shareholder needs
just 51% of shares to completely control the company. In this work, we first drew a
connection between these voting systems and auction theory. We then showed how it
is possible to modify these voting systems, using the proposed mechanism to enable
even the minority players to have an equitable say in the decisions.
As mentioned earlier, our mechanism uses sequential all-pay auctions with virtual
money for resource allocation. Since it is an auction based mechanism, it allows
the free market dynamics to come into play, and allows the agents full control in
their allocation. The equitability of the allocation is designed into the mechanism in
the form of allocation of the virtual money to the players. This kind of allocation
mechanism has the added advantage of being distributed, in that the bidding is done
by the individual agents. However, in any auction, regardless of format, it is important
to find the bidding strategy. The main contribution of this thesis is in identifying the
equilibrium bidding strategies for players under this mechanism.
In our work we considered two main versions of this mechanism:
* Perfect information case
e Imperfect information case
In the imperfect information case, the players do not know the valuations of the
other players. Instead, they know the distributions from which each player's valuation
of the object is drawn from. Here the underlying assumption is that each sequential
auction is valued independently with all the players valuations for the object being
auctioned are drawn randomly according to certain distributions and are private to
each player. In this scenario, it is possible to have a pure Nash Equilibrium bidding
strategy for each player, and moreover, this strategy yields an equitable allocation
of resources. For the purpose of our analysis, we considered an infinite horizon case,
wherein the player valuations of the objects were drawn from uniform distributions.
We found the optimal bidding strategy for both the two player and multi-player cases.
Other variations can make analysis intractable, and they may be solved numerically
in our future work.
The perfect information case, we found, was a more complex problem since there
were no pure strategy Nash Equilibria. Instead we had to search within the space
of mixed strategies. Our analysis here was limited to a two player game. Again, we
mainly analyzed the infinite horizon version of the game since it is more tractable. We
then delved a bit into analysis of the finite horizon versions of the game. We outlined
ways of finding the mixed strategy equilibria when players are restricted to a class of k-
modal strategies. However, we also showed that there is always an incentive to change
the size of the support for the players. We investigated the effects of changing the
support on the player payoffs and found that as the support size increases, both the
player payoffs get closer to 50%. Thus it is possible to tune the support size by putting
a cap on the maximum bid of each player such that the payoffs are equitable. Another
way to tune the payoffs is by varying the amount of virtual money allocated. We
found that as the allocation of virtual money increases, the majority player's payoff
increases. Thus, by the proper tuning of both the support size and the virtual money
allocation we can, in effect, ensure that this mechanism produces the desired result
of equitable resource allocation. Finally, we numerically solved the finite horizon
versions of this game and found that changing the support size and the virtual money
has similar effects as in the infinite horizon. However, due to discretization effects, it
may no longer be possible to get an exactly equitable allocation. We can then strive
to minimize the deviation from equitability by numerically solving the formulation
outlined in Chapter 2.
We finally discussed in detail the applications of this mechanism to democracy and
to battlefield resource allocation. We discussed ways to model the bills in a democ-
racy and showed how they fit into the perfect and imperfect information versions of
our mechanism. We also looked into the battlefield resource allocation problem and
showed how it fits the imperfect information version of our problem.
5.2 Future Work
There are multiple interesting avenues for future work in this project. One possible
avenue is to consider the imperfect information infinite horizon case with valuation
distributions other than uniform distribution. Analytically this analysis becomes in-
tractable, so the only way to solve this problem would be to find numerical algorithms
for evaluating the equilibrium strategy. Another possibility is to try to solve the finite
horizon version of the same problem. We can also look into the perfect information
case, and analyze the bidding strategies for multiplayer games, or even analyze two
player games but with bills of varying value. When considering two player games
with bills of varying values, we would have to come up with mized strategy probabil-
ity distribution functions that are in turn functions of the bid value. In essense the
problem becomes one of solving for a function of functions, which is quite complex.
5.2.1 Extensions to Multi-party Democracy
In addition to the extensions to our mechanism, we can also look into their applica-
tions to the democratic systems. In particular, we consider the case of multi-party
democracy that exists in countries like India, Israel and the United Kingdom. As is
evident from political situation in India and Britain, coalition dynamics is an impor-
tant component in such systems. Each party can be modeled as a player and thus
we end up with a multi-player game. The concept of core in cooperative game theory
lends a natural framework to study such games. We intend to study these games in
detail as a possible future extension of this work. In these situations, one interesting
feature is that the coalition votes together, so the voting strategy from a two player
game can be reused. However, the challenge here is to decide on how to split the
contribution of votes within the coalition, especially if the coalitions are temporary.
Here, some form if inverse Shapeley coefficients might need to be used, while ensuring
that the average vote constraint is still met. Another interesting aspect of this prob-
lem is that unlike in the imperfect information multi-player case, here the members of
the coalition share information about their valuations within the coalition. Since the
players have additional information, they should be able to vote more efficiently due
to the added 'value of this information'. Looking at how the voting strategy changes
with the additional information would be an interesting study in itself.
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